The Coming Realignment: Israel and the Powers That Will Shape Its Fate

Mapping Israel’s Allies in a Multipolar World 

The unipolar world that once anchored Israel’s security is rapidly eroding. Washington is signalling its intent to retreat from the region, Jerusalem is exploring ways to diversify its financial dependence on the United States, and younger generations in both major American parties are increasingly hostile toward Israel. And Israel cannot afford to be strategically constrained by a withdrawing United States It must cultivate partnerships that enable it to pursue its interests independently of increasingly unpredictable external actors.

In May 2026, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, one of Germany’s oldest political organizations and think tanks, published a predictive map outlining a future American ‘sphere’ under a multipolar world order.

As American presence recedes, other powers will move to fill the void - many of them hostile to Israel. Iran has been a belligerent power since the 1979 Revolution, contending with American influence in the region, yet it remains unclear how it will emerge from the current tensions. Beyond Iran, Turkey is positioning itself as the next regional hegemon, and the removal of American aid could reintroduce Egypt as a meaningful threat.

In such an emerging order, Israel must map and identify its key structural allies. Doing so requires understanding its fundamental economic needs and what it can offer in return. It also demands identifying the inherent structural rivals to these rising powers—states whose geography and economics place them naturally in opposition to Ankara, Cairo, and Tehran States whose economies complement Israel’s and who share its geopolitical rivals are the most promising candidates for long‑term partnership in the coming age.

  

Complementing Israel’s Strengths and Weaknesses

To find proper allies, Israel need not fear the retreat of American aid or the threat of sanctions should Washington withdraw its political shield at the United Nations. Israel lacks major natural resources, but its human capital remains its core strategic asset. It produces world‑class water and agricultural technologies, medicines, and battle‑tested military systems. What it lacks are raw materials, industrial scale, and physical space. Oil, steel, iron, silicon, lithium, cobalt, and nickel are all critical to the products Israel designs but cannot fully produce at home. Israel’s ideal partners are large industrial states with access to critical raw materials and the capacity to host production linked to Israel’s defence and technology supply chains. If these nations were also to be of need of Israeli ag-tech, medicines, or defensive products, the potential for these nations to become strategic partners would be considerably augmented.

 

In Samuel P Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations And the Remaking of World Order” he described a multipolar world organized into civilizational blocs—Turks, Arabs, Slavs, Hindus, Sinic, and so on. He also identified singular civilizations – Japan, and Ethiopia - that do not fit into larger blocs and face unique vulnerabilities. The Jewish civilization is such a culture. While the West was borne of the meeting of Athens and Jerusalem, it was Jerusalem which stood long before it, and it is Jerusalem being rebuilt today.

For Israel, this suggests that natural partners may emerge among other structurally isolated or threatened civilizations, especially where they share geopolitical rivals.

The Immediate Adversaries: Turkey, Egypt, and Iran

Iran

For decades Iran has constructed its “Ring of Fire” – a network of proxies enabling the Revolutionary Guard to project power across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Its ideological projection is not only a threat to Israel but additionally the Sunni world, principle among them, the Gulf states.

Geographically, Iran sits in one of the most mountainous regions of the globe, overlooking the fertile plains of Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. Iran boasts a vast quantity of oil on which its production and sales rest much of its economy. But beyond just oil, Iran also boasts large industrial capabilities. It has an extensive defence industry, and being one of the 15 major mineral rich countries in the world, means that its mines can supply domestically much of its own needs.

It continues to pursue nuclear capabilities to enhance both regime survivability and coercive power.

Now it is believed that Iran had planned the destruction of the state of Israel for years under a “Unity of Arenas” doctrine. Accordingly, Iran and Yemen were to provide ballistic missile and drone cover during a simultaneous barrage from both Hezbollah and Hamas, and simultaneous to all forces firing, Hamas and Hezbollah were to have launched an invasion from both the North and the South. Analysts believe the plan aimed to overwhelm Israeli air defences, confuse ground forces and cut off the country into two fronts. Such an event did not unfold, as infamously on Oct 7, Hamas took the initiative to begin such an assault without the preparation of the other forces.

Iran has already proven itself to be a deadly actor, and the current tensions have not yet ended. It is unclear whether a new regime will emerge soon, or following an arrangement from the United States, Iran will be allowed to lick its wounds and try again at another time.

 Egypt

In the past two years, Egypt has adopted an increasingly confrontational posture toward Israel. Suggesting that the peace agreement may be soon nullified and simulating Hamas like infiltrations in a military exercise which it performed on Israel’s border. A significant portion of the population remains sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, the parent group to Hamas and continuously faces great and increasing internal pressure to act against Israel. The peace agreement is heavily underpinned by American aid to both Egypt and Israel, yet Washington and Jerusalem have been broadcasting in the region that soon that aid will cease.

Egypt relies significantly on natural gas, including imports from Israel, to power its grid. However, Cairo has been building, under Russian authority and financing, its own nuclear power plant at El Dabaa, west of Alexandria. The first of four reactors is meant to become operational as soon as 2027. A nuclear‑powered Egypt would enjoy greater autonomy to act against Jerusalem and actualize all her past threats. If pursued, Egypt might be able to appease her own population as well as launch herself back to relevance within the Arab world.

Turkey

As recent as June 6th, 2026, the Turkish Interior Minister, in a sentence referencing the capture of Aleppo and Damascus by Turkish supported Islamist forces as well as the capture of Karabach by Azerbaijan, threatened that Jerusalem too would be returned to Turkish “dominion”. The numerous statements made by Turkish officials, including Erdogan himself and as well as his son are clear signals to the intent and direction of the country in the upcoming years.

But beyond rhetoric alone, Turkey has entrenched itself across the region, extending influence over the peripheries of its former empire. As detailed in a past article Ankara has extended herself across the Eastern Mediterranean into Libya. At the base of the Red Sea, Turkey maintains a substantial military presence in Somalia. And across the Caspian Sea, she is the visionary and maverick leader to the consolidating bloc of Organization of Turkish States.

To the West, Turkey is an integral and inseparable part of NATO, and an increasingly major arms supplier to European states. Ankara has been pursuing official entry into the European Union since 1987. While the application has been significantly delayed, the large Turkish diaspora and workforce in Europe, especially in France and Germany, are believed to be leveraged by Ankara to apply political pressure from within the Union, potentially to achieve this goal. If admitted, Turkey would become the EU’s fourth-largest economy, preceded by Italy, France, and Germany.

Geographically, Turkey controls the thoroughfare from the Black Sea and possesses such economic leverage on the Black Sea states which are dependent on it for trade. As such, if allowed into the halls of the European Union will essentially then inherit its former Ottoman Balkan territories as neo-vassal states. Regarding Israel, currently 40% of Israel’s oil is supplied by Azerbaijan through Turkish routes, and Turkey supplies 70% of Israel’s steel, an acute strategic vulnerability.

The Rivals to Israel’s Rivals

These rising powers- Turkey, Egypt and Iran have their own structural rivals, who are watching their ascent with growing unease.

Regarding Iran, the United Arab Emirates has stood alone as the one true and active participant of the Abraham Accords. The UAE has been the only Arab state to consistently stand alongside Israel—politically and militarily—against Iran. No matter the result of this conflict, Iran and the UAE will still share territorial disputes within the Persian Gulf. Within the Arab world, the UAE continues to become more ostracized following their actions in Somaliland, Sudan, and Yemen and distances itself even more from Saudi Arabia. As it appears, the UAE will emerge from this with hostile forces directed against it from across the sea as well as the desert.

While not entirely synergetic to the Israeli landscape, the UAE, being a major global oil exporter, does offer an ability for Israel to diversify its oil imports away from its strategic rivals. Moreso, the UAE has access to a large degree of capital, is potentially the only Gulf state to diversify its own economy away from oil, and possesses its own battle tested military forces. 

Moving to Egypt, there is only one other nation which Cairo has previously threatened with military action. Ethiopia, while not sitting directly on Egypt’s borders, does possess essential control of the near entirety of the Egyptian water supply. The Blue Nile provides roughly 85% of all the Nile’s water, giving Ethiopia enormous leverage. Addis Ababa, in a pursuit to expand the country’s electrical output, has recently finished the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, which has placed a valve on Egypt’s lifeline. While Egypt has managed to survive the filling period of the Dam, all that remains is one severe drought in Ethiopia to have catastrophic effects in Egypt. A strong Ethiopia inherently threatens Egypt’s strategic position. Amplifying Cairo’s threatening posture towards Addis Abbab, she has reached out noticeably to Eritrea to strengthen connections with the country and ensure that Ethiopia be denied maritime access to the Red Sea. And following Ethiopia and Somaliland’s’ MOU signed in 2024, Egypt has extended its reach as well to Somalia, with an aim to withhold what it calls ‘Ethiopian expansionism’.

Turkish presence, is already in Somalia, and following the same MOU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, Somalia expanded Turkey’s influence bringing the Somali Navy- its training, equipment, and the authority to protect and patrol Somalia’s EEZ into Turkish hands. The arrangement has effectively barred Ethiopia from pursuing stable lease ports in Somaliland. And Ankara’s pursuit of dominion over the Red Sea waterways has also led her to investments into the ports of Eritrea.

Ethiopia does not possess the same energy exports that the UAE does, however unlike the UAE it has a large population and large landmass. Thus, Ethiopia possesses the potential to supplement the production of the Israeli defence industries if factories were to be opened throughout the country. And while not currently an exporter, Ethiopia is known to be sitting on untapped reserves of iron, lithium, nickel, and silicon. The Israeli economy, boasting a large per capita of both investors and engineers, could come to provide the capital and expertise for development and actualization of the necessary mines, refineries, and factories throughout the country if relations deepen. There already exists a framework for cooperation between the countries as Israel is already a provider of ag-tech in the country. To fully realize the potential partnership between Ethiopia and Israel, Ethiopia must gain larger commercial access to the Red Sea, either through Somaliland which is already friendly to Israel, or through Eritrea, which may become turn an ally following the death of the dictator.

Yet regarding Turkey, there are more obvious rivals to its current trajectory. Turkey’s Mavi Vatan doctrine, which seeks to redraw maritime borders at Greece’s and Cyprus’s expense, places both states in direct opposition to Ankara. Cyprus and Greece continually voice diplomatic concern against the threat of Ankara citing Turkey’s continued trade embargo against Cyprus in addition to the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which occupies half of the island.
Turkey has previously opposed the construction of energy pipelines between Israel Cyprus and Greece and the integration of their energy systems, and even dispatched drilling vessels to destroy any infrastructure that had been laid. As Turkey’s position within NATO, and potentially the EU, grow, both Cyprus and Greece will come under greater threat. And while Turkey certainly dwarfs both nations, Greece fields one of the largest navies of Europe (6th) and maintains an air force larger than that of Germany or the UK.

 Despite its size, Greece additionally boasts a significant shipyard and drydock industry, where ship repairs as well as the construction for military hulls plays a significant role in the country’s economy. There exist joint economic ventures between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece in the fields of oil and gas explorations and development, desalination technologies and implementations, as well as other fields. And the military relationship between the three states is already considerably deep: Cyprus and Greece are both signatories to a ‘status of forces agreement’ which enable all of the countries to hosting and stationing their military forces in each others’ territory.

The Great Powers of the Multi-Polar World

The powers positioning and agitating for this new world order intend to be integral parts of its future. Iran is now in an on and off hot conflict with the United States, and many analysts are awaiting an incident in China and Taiwan to unravel within the next two decades. Relative to Iran, it must be said that the Persian power and the Jewish state are by no means geographic rivals. The nations share no borders, share no territorial disputes, and do not compete over any resources. Historically, the polities of the Levant had to fear powers from Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and Egypt and under such an equation the Persian counterweight was often welcomed. Culturally, the Persian and Jewish peoples share a deep and overlapping history recounting shared chapters in the rise of Cyrus the Great and a potential of Darius II being the son of Queen Esther. Regardless of the validity of any of those claims, Iran is not geographically engineered to be a constant threat to the Levant or its inhabitants.

Hostilities with the country today are clearly of a religious nature, and under a different regime, Iran could very well be a potentially major strategic partner to Israel.

China however is a different story. China is a massive nation with vast industrial capabilities. China possesses near global monopolies over several rare earth metals and therefore possesses key materials necessary for hi-tech and smarter defence systems. China is resource‑hungry and heavily dependent on imported energy. The country is energy poor and requires vast amounts of oil and gas to be imported for its industrialized society to continue to function and grow. Israel cannot meet China’s core needs, and moving forward Jerusalem can assume that Beijing will structurally lean toward the oil producers, whose energy exports it depends on.

However, this reality only increases the synergy between Israel and China’s principal rival – India. China and India in the past have already had border skirmishes over territorial disputes and see each other as rivals in Southeast Asia. China also has supported India’s historic enemy of Pakistan and its alliance to Pakistan has formed its own version of a ‘ring of fire’ around the subcontinent. Chinese investments significantly boost Pakistan’s economic prospects, specifically through the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The recent alignment of the major Sunni bloc of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan further pushes India and Israel into each others’ arms. In the most recent conflict of Operation Sindoor, it was discovered that Turkey had sent both servicemen and munitions to aid Pakistan. India has already responded to such developments by sending its own armaments, particularly missiles, to Greece, Cyprus, and Armenia.

 India’s economy is highly complementary to Israel’s. India offers a vast workforce, major industrial capacity, and significant production of key metals. While it is an importer of crude oil, it possesses a multitude of refining plants with which it exports surpluses. Beyond just refining oil, India is the world’s second largest steel producer and a significant producer of iron ores. Beyond steel, India is also a significant producer and exporter of aluminium, zinc, and lead – key industrial metals. And New Delhi has used this massive industrial base to likewise become a global exporter of conventional munitions. Relations with India are already strong, as Israel has been highlighted by New Delhi as a supplier of advanced weapon systems as well as agricultural collaboration. As the threats of Turkey-Pakistan or China grow, that relationship is likely to deepen.

Addressing the Bear in the Room

One major power remains unaddressed: Russia. Certainly, the relationship with the country is both controversial as well as complex, yet there exist many reasons that in a multipolar world, its interests would largely align with that of Israel’s.

The nation of Russia has largely been an enabling force to Israel’s regional rivals throughout much of its history. It has been an arms supplier to Israel’s enemies, and even following the October 7th attacks, hosted Hamas leaders in Moscow. However, for Moscow, this alliance with the Arab parties at large was borne of geopolitical realities that are no longer bearing fruit.

 Russia is a major exporter of raw materials—oil, gas, coal, grain, nickel, and steel. With the Arab world not nearly possessing the same natural wealth as Russia, and largely only producing oil which Russia does not need, beyond participating in the oil cartel of OPEC, there is not much material gain or offset to any Russian weaknesses to be made form the partnership. Additionally, Russia has historically needed a warm water port outside of the Black Sea and has shown preference for a lease port in the Mediterranean to bypass the Turkish Straits and maintain a force there. Yet following the fall of Assad, and his flight to Moscow, the new regime in Damascus has since removed the Russians from the both the port of Latakia and the port of Tarsus, which has severely cut down the Russian footprint in the state. Moscow has sought out a similar port in the Red Sea at Port Sudan to grant it unfettered commercial access to the Indian Ocean as well, but such developments have been stalled by the instability of Sudan. And while the Arab states have also been importers of Russian grain, grain products, like oil or coal, will always have a buyer. Politically, Russian alignment with Arab powers could be viewed as a countering balance towards American influence in the region, yet with America signalling that it wishes to leave the region, potentially entirely, what political reason remains for the Russians to maintain these relations? At home the prestige of the Russian army has fallen in recent years as a result of its incursion into Ukraine, and its military equipment has proven not as battle worthy as previously thought.

In a multipolar era, Russia may seek a stable partner with Mediterranean and Red Sea access, industrial needs, and internationally sought after advanced military technology.

 Beyond the relations with the Arab world, Russia has historically been the geopolitical rival of Turkey, where its control over movement through the Black Sea has been a historic bottleneck and chokehold over the country. Turkey will become more of an obvious rival as Moscow and Ankara compete over influence in the former Soviet and Turkic states of Central Asia, where Turkey is seeking to establish itself as the leader of the Turkic bloc through the OTS.

Furthermore, there already exists a certain harmony between a number of these potential structural allies. Despite global sanctions, Russia has maintained friendly ties with India – which is known to be a principal purchaser of sanctioned Russian goods. Because of these sanctions, these products are purchased in the Indian rupee which are then redirected back into the Indian economy as investments and integration of Moscow into other Indian industries. This relationship has created a symbiotic integration between the Russian and Indian economies. Surely, a Russian-Israeli detente would align neatly with New Delhi’s existing foreign policy. In Ethiopia, Russia enjoys a diplomatic and cultural legacy since the period of the Tsar and Ethiopian Empire. The cultural tie between the country might be most representative by the fact that there exists a statue of Alexander Pushkin, Russia’s national poet, in Addis Ababa. Pushkin, after all, was the grandson of an Ethiopian slave made Russian noble. Relations between the countries have largely been warm, neither Moscow nor Addis Ababa will condemn the other, for either Ukraine or the Tigray War. And today Russia is a principal economic investor, expanding currency exchanges with Ethiopia as well as developing nuclear power in the country.

 Russia possesses both the steel output and oil to accommodate Israel’s needs, as well as an existing industrial capacity which might be outfitted with Israeli technologies, increasing both the quality of the Russian army as well as opening the bottleneck on the supply chain of necessary Israeli conventional munitions. Israel can offer stable port access in both the Red Sea as well as the Eastern Mediterranean, providing a lever for Moscow against Turkey. Both Ethiopia and India already enjoy profitable relations with Russia, and so developing relations with Moscow would not harm Israeli positions in either the Horn of Africa or the Asian subcontinent.

In such a world, it is not certain to what degree international organizations will hold power or exist at all. But if the United States should turn so hostile to Israel that it denies Israel the traditional diplomatic shield and veto power it enjoyed at the UN, Russia can just as easily supply it.

Moscow is far from an ideal partner, but the strategic and economic synergies are real. Despite the obvious challenges to such a partnership, in a new multipolar age the benefits may come to the fore. If the multipolar world is realized, and the US begins withdrawing significantly form the region, the practicality of a continued relation between Iran and Russia as well as Russia and the larger Arab world changes dramatically. Regardless of how their relationship develops, Russian and Iranian military interdependence is unlikely to disappear overnight, and unless a fundamental change also occurs in the regime of Tehran, Russia will remain a volatile regional actor that Israel will need to keep close but never fully trust.

 Moving Forward

Israel must act proactively to shape this emerging multipolar landscape rather than be shaped by it.

If Ethiopia is to serve as a long‑term counterweight to Egypt, Israel should expand beyond agricultural assistance and begin laying the foundations for Ethiopian industrialization—encouraging Israeli entrepreneurship in the country, investing in its mineral and manufacturing sectors, and supporting its pursuit of reliable Red Sea access. At the same time, Israel must begin engaging Russia with caution and clear‑eyed suspicion. Moscow’s rivalry with Turkey, its abundance of raw materials, and its need for technological modernization create a narrow but meaningful overlap of interests. None of these relationships will replace the United States, but together they can form a structural network of partners—India, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, Ethiopia, and even Russia—whose own geopolitical trajectories align with Israel’s. In a world no longer anchored by American primacy, Israel must build the alliances that ensure its autonomy and security in the decades ahead.