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Friday, June 5, 2026

 The End of Beijing's Global Ambition

Burning the African bridge to build the Eurasian fortress 

 

The Belt and Road experiment is over. Africa saw a brutal $52 billion reversal between 2020 and 2024—from net recipient to net payer. Beijing stopped lending and started collecting. Africa was the test, Eurasia is the answer.
 Don’t call it a retreat. It’s consolidation—though whether it’s strategic genius or forced triage is the real question. Africa was Beijing’s testing ground for the Belt and Road fantasy. They locked in the minerals they needed, gathered the intel, and now they’re cashing out the periphery to reinforce the core. 


Zambia's five-year debt restructuring shows the pattern: no principal haircuts, just maturity extensions that preserve Chinese claims on copper and cobalt. At least 17 sub-Saharan countries face the same choice—accept Beijing's terms or watch infrastructure crumble. The old "Steel Silk Road" is getting stripped for parts to build the "Silicon Silk Road."

But here's what matters: domestic crises are forcing the move. A property crash that erased $18 trillion in household wealth. A demographic collapse that will cut the working-age population by 200 million by 2050—fewer young minds to drive tomorrow's innovation, less room for waste on far-flung bets. Western chip sanctions exposing supply chain vulnerabilities. Beijing isn't executing a master plan. It's managing a crisis.

The domestic imperative: repatriation as survival

China's home front is burning through cash. The property bust has vaporized $18 trillion in household wealth, banks are wobbling, and local governments are buried in off-books debt. The demographic cliff is steeper: 200 million fewer working-age people by 2050 means not just lower output but a real choke on new ideas, the kind of creativity that fuels breakthroughs. Then there's the tech chokehold—Western chip sanctions have hit hard, forcing Beijing to pour everything into the "Big Fund" and domestic semiconductor pushes.

Capital isn't infinite anymore. Every dollar tied up in an African road is a dollar missing from a cutting-edge fab or a bank rescue. That $52 billion pulled from Africa isn't disappearing—it's heading home to plug holes and build the tech stack China needs to endure.

But let's be clear about what that $52 billion represents. Part of it is loan mechanics—projects from 2013-2017 hitting principal repayment schedules. China didn't decide to reverse flows; the amortization timelines decided for them. What changed is the decision to stop rolling forward new mega-projects. That's the signal: not cashing out existing bets, but refusing to double down.

Lending to Africa cratered to $2.1 billion in 2024, down from $20 billion peaks a decade earlier. Beijing isn't playing global benefactor now. Survival comes first. Growth below 5% leaves no margin for vanity projects with shaky returns. The money is flowing to places that pay off fast and secure the future—high-power AI centers, sanction-resistant factories. Africa, rich in commodities but messy with debt risks, was always the expendable piece.

The Central Asian pivot: digital heartland or political minefield?

Look to the C5—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan—and you'll see where the cash landed. In the first half of 2025, Africa got scraps ($2.1 billion total for the year), while Central Asia pulled in $25 billion. Chinese FDI in the region jumped from $19.6 billion in 2016 to $35.9 billion by mid-2025.

This isn't the concrete-pouring BRI of the past. It's "Silicon Silk Road"—pure tech lock-in. Kazakhstan got 1 billion yuan for an AI lab with Zhejiang University, aiming for 1 to 10 exaflops of computing power. That's not aid; that's embedding Chinese standards into the region's infrastructure—water systems, disaster alerts, farm digitization, all running on Beijing's code. Huawei and ZTE are wiring 5G across the C5, making sure the digital lifeline flows through Chinese equipment.

Energy fits the pattern. SANY Renewable Energy is delivering two 1,000 MW wind farms in Uzbekistan ($2.2 billion) and a $114 million blade factory in Kazakhstan. China National Nuclear Corporation is the frontrunner for Kazakhstan's third nuclear plant. Solar is spreading too—Tajikistan's 1.5 GW and Uzbekistan's 500 MW. Kazakhstan alone took $23 billion in the first half of 2025: $12 billion from East Hope Group for aluminum, $7.5 billion in copper.

It's deliberate. Beijing is shaping a digital heartland where AI, 5G, and nuclear control create leverage that lasts. Central Asia's location and resources make it perfect: trade booms (record highs in 2025), and the dependencies run deep. You can walk away from a road. You can't unplug a national AI grid or nuclear supply without chaos.

But the fortress has cracks before it's finished. Central Asia is fragile—Kyrgyzstan had violent regime change in 2020, Tajikistan runs on remittances (95% dependency), Turkmenistan is a hermit state. Russia still owns the security architecture through CSTO and won't cede ground easily. And these states aren't passive recipients—they're playing China against Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf states to maximize extraction while minimizing dependency.

Kazakhstan wants Chinese capital, Russian security, European legitimacy, and Turkish cultural ties. That's not subordination. That's sophisticated rent-seeking.

ASEAN: strategic hedging, not strategic capture

Central Asia handles the digital infrastructure; ASEAN is the industrial hedge. Total FDI into the region hit $235 billion in 2024, with Chinese money down 29% from the 2022 peak but pivoting hard to equity stakes in strategic sectors. From 2018 to 2024, Chinese manufacturing FDI targeted automotive (45%, $26.4 billion greenfield in 2023 alone), ICT/electronics (15%, 72% of new investments in 2024), and renewables (15%).

The play is sanction-proofing. As tariffs bite "Made in China," Beijing ensures "Owned by China" stays profitable. Semiconductors show it: Vietnam's FPT built a $30 million testing facility in 2025; Malaysia's Penang has Intel's $7 billion plant next to a $250 million ARM design hub, with Chinese hands in the mix. Thailand is PCB central, led by Chinese and Taiwanese firms.

EVs tell the same story. Indonesia pulls massive Chinese nickel investments; Thailand absorbs assembly lines. Western brands pay the price—Subaru, Suzuki, Nissan closing Thai factories by 2025, outgunned by Chinese scale. Trade numbers underline the shift: China-ASEAN hit $234 billion in Q1 2025, heading past $1 trillion yearly, with ASEAN now China's top trading partner (nearly 20% of total).

But here’s what the fortress narrative misses: ASEAN states aren’t becoming Chinese vassals. Vietnam received $7 billion from Intel while accepting Chinese semiconductor equipment. Indonesia’s nickel deals include Chinese processing but Australian mining partnerships. Thailand hosts Chinese EV plants and U.S.-Japan supply chain initiatives simultaneously.

This is the decades-old Southeast Asian playbook—omni-alignment, playing great powers against each other, extracting maximum value while preserving autonomy. No debt traps here, just ownership stakes. But ownership that has to compete with American, Japanese, European, and Korean alternatives every single quarter.

The digital curtain—aspiration or reality?

Beijing's endgame is what I call the Digital Curtain—a hard boundary sealing its economic sphere. CIPS challenging SWIFT as yuan trade grows in Eurasia. Tech standards pushing Huawei 5G and Chinese AI governance. Data laws tilting toward Beijing's model. Supply chains locking in: ASEAN semiconductor back-ends under Chinese equity, Central Asian minerals tied to Beijing firms.

It's the Great Firewall stretched to the Caspian, controlling ecosystems from Kazakhstan to Malaysia.

But let’s stress-test the narrative. CIPS processes under 5% of cross-border transactions as of late 2024. The yuan represents 2-3% of global reserves. Huawei’s 5G is getting ripped out of European networks and facing scrutiny even in friendlier markets. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and all ASEAN states still run SWIFT for primary settlements.

The Digital Curtain exists more as aspiration than infrastructure. The fortress has ambition, but the walls aren’t sealed yet.

The West’s pushback—the EU’s €300 billion Global Gateway, G7 infrastructure plays—is too slow, too scattered, too paralyzed by process. While Beijing cuts deals in months with unified standards and direct state backing, Western initiatives chase private capital and debate ESG compliance for years. By the time protocols are signed, Chinese code may already run the critical systems.

But that’s “may,” not “will.” The competition isn’t over. It’s just playing out on very different timelines.

The verdict: consolidation, not fortress—yet

Here’s what we know for certain: China is consolidating. The African experiment is being liquidated, capital is flowing back to Eurasia, and Beijing is prioritizing tech lock-in over infrastructure breadth.

What we don’t know: whether this consolidation reflects strategic strength or forced necessity. The domestic crisis—$18 trillion wealth destruction, 200 million demographic decline, semiconductor sanctions—creates capital scarcity that makes African infrastructure unaffordable. Central Asia and ASEAN may be the last options willing to take Chinese money on Beijing’s terms, not the best options for building an impenetrable sphere.

The fortress narrative assumes Beijing is executing a master plan. The triage narrative suggests they’re making the best of a constrained hand. The data supports both. The difference matters enormously for how you position.

For anyone allocating capital—consultant, investor, policymaker—the middle ground is narrowing, but it hasn’t vanished. Kazakhstan’s AI labs and Malaysia’s chip plants are pulling regions toward Chinese standards. But Vietnam’s Intel partnerships and Indonesia’s multi-sourced supply chains show that autonomy remains possible.

The Curtain is hardening, but it’s not sealed. Payment systems are splitting, but they’re not bifurcated. Standards are diverging, but they’re not incompatible. By 2030, you’ll likely need to pick a side on critical infrastructure—but that choice isn’t binary yet, and smart players are keeping options open.

Africa’s liquidation sent a message: the era of blank checks is dead. Eurasia’s consolidation is the response: capital flowing to regions that can still absorb it, technologies that can still deliver leverage, partnerships that can still pay off.

Whether that consolidation becomes a fortress or fragments into competitive multi-alignment depends on choices being made right now—in Astana, Hanoi, Jakarta, and Washington. The outcome isn’t written. But the direction is clear, and the window for shaping it is closing fast.

Position accordingly.

 

 Another Week of Mark Carney’s Politicospeak

 

The Prime Minister says one thing in Ottawa and another in New York. He prefers scripts and lecterns. Otherwise, he talks in broken sentences, using modifying clauses and ambiguous phraseology. He repeats euphemisms, platitudes, and progressive catch phrases. He tends to speak in first-person when claiming an accomplishment and uses a passive voice when addressing a failure of government. He overuses bromides and likes to slip in nostalgic jargon intended for his Boomers’ audience. It’s PM Mark Carney’s suave politicospeak and Canadians heard an earful of it this past week.

Statistics Canada reported that Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined marginally in the first quarter of 2026, after negative growth in the last quarter of 2025. An economist’s definition of a recession is two consecutive quarters with declining GDP. As a point of fact, the data shows that Canada’s economy has declined in three of the last four quarters, a period coinciding with the spring 2025 re-election of the Liberals in Ottawa.

Jack Mintz, president’s fellow at the University of Calgary School of Public Policy, commented on the country’s economic malaise, “It’s not a great picture. We’ve had this poor growth in investment now for many years, and this is continuing the trend.” Steven Globerman, of the Fraser Institute, echoed this assessment, “Canada’s capital investment and productivity emergency persists. Substantial increases in business investment in asset categories critical to productivity growth are required before Canada will be able to say that the emergency is over.”

The PM, however, did not utter the “R” word when responding to a direct question about the Statistics Canada report and whether Canada is in a recession. Carney answered, “I’ll say this about the economy. You know, we are in the process of laying the foundations for a stronger, more resilient, more independent Canadian economy. That process is settling in.” He described Canada’s latest data as “uneven” and the economy showing “some weakness, in part because of clear decisions by the government.” He then pinned the country’s troubled economy on his government’s “taking back control of immigration” which has resulted in lower population growth, and “reined in government spending.” He later added, “You have these cross-currents as the economy is being fundamentally transformed. We’ll continue to work, we’re making progress but there’s more to be done.”

The questions regarding Canada’s recession carried through numerous news cycles as the PM avoided attending the House of Commons for a couple of days and then, when he did show up, he refused to seriously engage with Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre. For days ministers repeatedly blamed U.S. President Donald Trump for Canada’s shrinking economy. Outside of parliament, the press corps aggressively challenged Poilievre on “his negativity” in raising the Statistics Canada data. In contrast to these deflections form the PM and Liberal mouthpieces, Poilievre was direct in addressing the new economic data (view here and below). 

In one scrum, the Opposition Leader asserted,

“Mr. Trump’s policies are effecting all G7 countries and none of them are in recession. Mexico shares a border with the United States; Mexico is not in recession. Only Canada, under Mark Carney’s Liberal policies is in a recession…. It seems the other countries despite Mr. Trump’s unfair tariffs have been able to craft policies to avoid recession. It is only here under Mark Carney’s policies that we find ourselves in a recession.”

Introducing the new Ministerial Advisory Council on Rights, Equality, and Inclusion

 

This week PM Carney was at the Holy Blossom Temple, a Jewish synagogue in Toronto, to announce his government’s action on the crisis of antisemitism in Canada. Given the subject matter it was remarkable that, while denouncing the rising incidents of antisemitism, the PM failed to mention the source of the problem. Carney made no mention of Israel, Zionism, or October 7th, and he avoided identifying the perpetrators of the vile antisemitic actions in the streets of Toronto, Montreal and across the country. More to the point, Carney delivered a series of platitudes to the Jewish community with no reassurances that the federal government would seek out the purveyors of hate, apply the law, and protect the wronged. Micheal Geist, University of Ottawa professor, assessed Carney’s hollow words, “In delivering a speech lacking in urgency, that prioritizes criticism of Israel over the safety of Canadians, and which comes up empty on new ideas, the Prime Minister failed to meet the moment.”


No words can possibly convey how insulting Carney’s new committee – the Ministerial Advisory Council on Rights, Equality, and Inclusion – is to many in Canada’s Jewish community. Consider that the committee tasked with answering to antisemitism is chaired by minister Marc Miller, who is the former immigration minister responsible for permitting without background checks an increasing number of Muslim activists into the country; includes former Trudeau government minister Omar Alghabra, one-time president of the Canadian Arab Federation who advocated for the legalization of Hamas and Hezbollah; also lawyer Avnish Nanda, who sued the University of Alberta when it attempted to close down the pro-Hamas encampment celebrating the October 7 massacre.

Simon Wolle, CEO of B’nai Brith Canada, summed up the Jewish community’s profound disappointment in the PM’s address and announcement: it has neither “acknowledged the full scope of the systemic failures that have allowed anti-Semitism to flourish, nor identified those responsible for inciting and fomenting anti-Semitism across the country.” Wolle contended,

“Canada is not facing an anti-Semitism awareness problem. Canada has an anti-Semitism problem. The country has been poisoned with Jew hatred and we need a remedy. Our children are no safer today than they were yesterday. Threats to our communities and institutions remain equally unchecked today as they did yesterday.”

There has been strong, biting reactions to the inadequacy of PM Carney’s orchestrated speaking event at Holy Blossom Temple. On Parliament Hill, Poilievre stated Canadian Jews deserve an apology for their open border policies and soft-on-crime laws that have contributed to the antisemitism crisis on Canada’s streets. Conservative MP Melissa Lantsman, a Jewish woman representing a heavily Jewish riding of Thornhill, stated the government should have announced concrete actions and later said in Parliament, “The Prime Minister delivered a speech on anti Semitism so neutered that an anti Semite would have given it a standing ovation.”

Perhaps the Globe and Mail editorial board put it most civilly in their lead editorial, “The missing words in Mark Carney’s antisemitism speech”: “He should have said: ‘If you oppose Israel’s existence, if you demonize Jewish-Canadians, you are wrong, you are hateful and I stand against you.’” (Note to the PM: the G&M editors have effectively expressed the essence of the matter in a single sentence of plain-speak.)

 


 

Nigel Farage Isn't the Problem. The Political Class is the Problem 


 

I do not usually write several pieces on the same story. But I genuinely believe that the murder of Henry Nowak represents a watershed moment in modern Britain.

Already, among the British people, the horrific murder and treatment of Henry has sparked a widespread and intensifying debate in the country.

Many people are now asking entirely legitimate questions.

Why are police officers in this country taught to react differently to crimes depending on whether they involve ethnic minorities or people from the white majority?

What happened to people being treated equally before the law, irrespective of their racial, ethnic, or religious background?

And why are perverse ideologies from America that promote anti-British, anti-Western, and anti-white ideas now circulating widely among not only the police but schools, universities, the health service, media, government, and more?

But while millions of Brits are asking these important and valid questions, what we also learned this week is that the ruling class clearly does not want to have this debate.

Rather than engage seriously with the concerns and grievances that are being voiced out there, by the silent majority, Prime Minister Keir Starmer and countless Members of Parliament instead chose to retreat into their comfort zone by blaming the one person who was forcing these questions onto the agenda: Nigel Farage.

When Nigel Farage, leader of Reform UK, stood up during Prime Minister’s Questions this week to voice his entirely justifiable concerns about “two-tier policing”, he was widely jeered, criticised, and attacked in the House of Commons.

Keir Starmer, Tory party leader Kemi Badenoch, and leader of Restore, Rupert Lowe, all accused Farage of exploiting the tragedy and creating division.

Countless MPs hit the media to say Nigel Farage is being irresponsible. To say he is disrespecting the Nowak family. To criticise him for “politicising” the issue.

As commentator Konstantin Kisin quipped, if you listened to the British media this week you’d think Henry Nowak was killed by Nigel Farage’s comments.

But millions of ordinary people will have seen something else. They will have spent much of this week witnessing blatant, overwhelming, unavoidable hypocrisy.

Only six years ago, when George Floyd was killed in Minneapolis, in 2020, almost every single one of these same politicians adopted a radically different tone.

Keir Starmer declared that George Floyd’s death, in America, “should be the catalyst for change” here in Britain. London Mayor Sadiq Khan said Floyd’s death had “rightly ignited fury and anguish” around the world.

And Labour’s Shabana Mahmood, who castigated Farage in the House this week, six years ago told her constituents: “I share their anger at this unspeakable outrage.”


Notice the language. “Rightly”. “Fury.” “Anger.” “Share”. “A catalyst for change.”

Six years ago, the ruling class in Westminster told Britain and the world that public outrage over racism and policing should not only be voiced and heard but amplified, respected and acted upon by every institution in British society.

That’s what happened.

We all lived through it. We all saw it. We all felt it. And we all watched the political, media, and cultural class bend over backwards to impose major changes.

But today, in sharp contrast, the reaction to an eerily similar case - the death of a young man amidst police incompetence and while muttering the exact same words (“I can’t breathe”) - could hardly be more different.

This time, the very same people who immediately ‘took the knee’ for a revolutionary, anti-Western, anti-democratic, and anti-white organisation now tell us “it is very important not to politicise a personal tragedy” or “cause division”.

This time, the very same people who used the death of a career criminal in America to justify a full-blown cultural revolution in the West tell us “we must restrain ourselves so as to respect the wishes of the Nowak family” (although, interestingly, when the mother of Rhiannon Whyte, who was stabbed to death by an illegal migrant, called for an end to illegal migration Starmer did not want respect the wishes of that family).

This time, the very same MPs who supported or even joined Black Lives Matter protests and riots on the streets of our capital city while openly breaking Covid laws publicly condemn any similar disturbances and riots relating to Henry Nowak.

And this time, the political class and their allies in the media have made it crystal clear that the only response they consider proper and socially acceptable is the very opposite to what followed Black Lives Matter only six years ago.

Righteous anger? Not allowed. Protesting on the streets? Not this time. Expressing rage? You should be ashamed of yourself. Wanting the tragedy to become a “catalyst for change” to two-tier policing? I’m afraid now you’ll find that the very same people who only six years ago tried to have us believe that every single institution in British society was “institutionally racist” now say “two-tier policing” could not possibly exist.

In fact, this week the British people were put in the utterly absurd position of being told by Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer and his deputy David Lammy that “two-tier policing does not exist” while on the very same day the country’s most senior police chiefs admitted in The Times newspaper they were “reviewing controversial guidance advising officers to treat ethnic minorities differently”. 


 

In other words, the very same politicians who tried to introduce more lenient prison sentences for criminals from minority backgrounds now want you to believe that two-tier justice “does not exist”. Clearly, there are no limits to the extent to which the political class will try and gaslight the British people.

Even Starmer’s cynical use of the Nowak family is outrageous.

If you go back and actually listen to what Henry’s father, Mark Nowak, said, he was very careful to point to Henry’s “inhumane” and “degrading” treatment by the police and contrast it with the “decency” with which they treated his murderer, Vikrum Digwa. He was very clearly pointing to two-tier policing while also underlining his determination to use this appalling tragedy to “make change for the better”.

The entirely legitimate question that must now be asked and debated across the country is how to make that change for the better. I have made some suggestions, as have many others, including Nigel Farage and Reform UK. But Keir Starmer, Labour, and much of the political class clearly do not want us to have this debate at all.

Why? Because what we are witnessing is exactly the same playbook the political class used after Brexit, the Manchester Evening News Arena bombing, the murder of Sir David Amess, the grooming gangs, and the Southport atrocity.

Rather than engage seriously with the underlying issue, with the actual issue, the political class now only tries to police the reaction to these events. It has become hopelessly and profoundly out-of-touch with the people it claims to serve.

Brexit? Don’t lower immigration, restore sovereignty, and help left behind people. Blame Nigel Farage, Cambridge Analytica, and deride voters as gammons and racists.

The Manchester bombing? Don’t address Islamism and stop importing people who hate us. Blame “division” and sing songs about not looking back in anger.

Sir David Amess? Definitely. Do. Not. Mention. Islamism. Blame social media and distract everybody with a debate about “online safety”.

The grooming gangs? Don’t hold an immediate statutory inquiry into the worst scandal in British history before crushing every grooming gang in the country.

Blame Tommy Robinson, Nigel Farage, and Elon Musk for “whipping up division” while hoping that nobody notices there is still no inquiry and the gangs remain rife.

Southport? Don’t fix the borders, end mass immigration and stop importing people from radically different cultures who glorify violence. Once again, blame Nigel Farage and ‘far-right thugs’ while clamping down on free speech.

Henry Nowak? Don’t acknowledge and address the blatant two-tier policing that led officers to prioritise allegations of racial abuse over doing their job properly. Instead, blame Nigel Farage once again and warn everybody else not to “cause division”.

Time and time again, we see the same pattern. A political class that has become so weak, so cowardly, and so desperate to distract people from scrutinising its own legacy that it is now more determined to try and turn this into a debate about Nigel Farage or Elon Musk rather than acknowledge and deal with the underlying issue.

What we are witnessing is a political class, a regime, that is rapidly losing control of the narrative and is desperately trying to regain it - if not impose it.

But this strategy, as we can see from the aftermath of Southport to events this week, is simply no longer working because more and more people can see, with their own eyes, what is happening to the country.

What millions of people can see, clearly, is that the debate over Henry Nowak is not simply a debate over Nigel Farage. It is about how some groups are being treated more favourably than others. It is about how only some grievances are considered legitimate while others are caricatured, mocked and dismissed. And it is about how the same standards and level of respect are no longer shown to different groups.

The longer Keir Starmer and the political class refuse to engage seriously and honestly with these concerns about what is actually happening to Britain, the more they and the wider system will lose people’s trust and confidence.

This is what has been building up slowly but relentlessly in the system — through the debates over Brexit, the grooming gangs, the Islamist bombings, Southport, mass immigration, broken borders, Muslim sectarianism and more — a growing awareness among millions of ordinary people out there in the country that the system is simply no longer interested in dealing with the things that are actually tearing Britain apart.

Worse, it is now only interested in managing the reaction to these things through a draconian clampdown on free speech, free expression, and free debate.

This is a very dangerous place for any society to be. The more people withdraw their trust and confidence, the weaker the system will become before, inevitably, at some point in the not-too-distant future, collapsing altogether.

This, more than anything else, is why the murder of Henry Nowak may prove to be a watershed moment in British politics. Because it has pulled back the curtain to reveal just how out-of-touch and self-serving the political regime has become.

The only question is whether the regime will now turn back and address the underlying issues that are tearing our country apart before it really is too late.


 The Myth of Palestinian Self-Determination

The Arabs of the Mandate chose their identity, more than once. Each time, they were ignored by those who would bend them into weapons


A personal note before you read this article: Having studied the Arab-Israeli conflict for nearly 30 years, living inside it for almost 20 years, and working within it for 10 years, the topic is very close to my heart. Despite the severe tone of much of my writing (which is earned by the current state of the conflict), I have also met many Arabs and Palestinians along the journey. Many have been far from my enemy, some have been very good friends.

These are the people who inspired me to step back from the political conflict and to look with empathy to understand the formation of the modern Palestinian identity, and the paths not taken that those friends rested their own identities on.

What I found on this journey does not change the present day political situation, it does not change the foundational flaws that I have and will continue to call out in the Palestinian National movement and in Palestinianism, but it is a worthwhile reminder that the human cost of the games of empires (old and new) are real.


When the Arab leadership of Palestine gathered in Jerusalem in January 1919 to state their demands for the Paris Peace Conference, they reached a unanimous conclusion. They were not Palestinian. The First Palestine Arab Congress resolved that Palestine was “nothing but part of Arab Syria,” bound by “national, religious, linguistic, moral, economic, and geographic bounds” to the north, and that the region should not be “separated from the independent Arab Syrian government.” The recognized Arab political leadership from across the territory had convened for the explicit purpose of stating who they were and what they wanted. What they wanted was Syria.

They were not given it. French forces expelled the Hashemite ruler Faisal from Damascus in 1920 and destroyed the Syrian option militarily. When the 1948 war ended, Palestinian notables gathered at Jericho and expressed a preference a second time: the conference formally requested annexation to Transjordan, stating that “Palestine Arabs desire unity between Transjordan and Arab Palestine.” The Hashemite Kingdom gave them citizenship, parliamentary representation, and passports. The arrangement functioned until Jordan stripped that citizenship in 1988. Meanwhile, the moderate wing of Palestinian Arab politics, the Nashashibi faction that had advocated pragmatic coexistence with the British Mandate, was killed off. The Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939 functioned as an internal purge, with the Husseini faction systematically eliminating Arab leaders who had chosen accommodation over maximalism.

Nations follow a recognizable sequence when they form. A people develop distinct consciousness through language, land, and shared memory. That consciousness generates a political movement, which eventually produces a state. America worked this way. Zionism worked this way. Jewish peoplehood had persisted through two thousand years of exile, carrying a language, a liturgy, and a specific geography, before Theodor Herzl wrote a single word. The movement came after the people.

Palestinianism inverted this. The movement came first. The Palestine Liberation Organization was created in Cairo in May 1964 by the Arab League, not by Palestinians. Its founding chairman, Ahmed Shuqeiri, had served as Saudi Arabia’s representative to the United Nations and then as Syria’s, representing two other Arab states before being placed to lead an organization the Arab League designed, funded, and controlled. The founding charter confirms the arrangement: Article 1 defines Palestinians as “part of the Arab nation,” and Article 24 explicitly disclaimed sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, territories then held by Jordan and Egypt. Nobody at Cairo in May 1964 was proposing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Those territories were Jordanian and Egyptian. The concept did not yet exist.

Whoever holds the movement controls the definition of the people. There is no prior stable identity to anchor to, no bedrock consciousness that exists independent of the political project’s current requirements. The same territories the founding charter had excluded from Palestinian claims became the core of those claims after 1967. Oslo diplomacy in the 1990s created demand for historical priority arguments, and the leadership began asserting Canaanite ancestry. Mahmoud Abbas told the UN Security Council in 2018 that Palestinians were “descendants of the Canaanites that lived in the land of Palestine 5,000 years ago.” These claims were absent from every Palestinian political document before the 1970s and are flatly rejected by Hamas, which grounds Palestinian claims in the Islamic conquest of the seventh century rather than in Bronze Age genealogy. Two wings of the same national movement hold mutually exclusive accounts of where the people came from. An inherited folk identity does not produce that degree of internal disagreement about its own origins.

An entire institutional apparatus then locked the construction in place. UNRWA, created exclusively for Palestinian refugees, operates under a definition of refugee status unlike anything else in international law. The 1951 Refugee Convention, which governs every other displaced population in the world, terminates refugee status when individuals acquire citizenship elsewhere. UNRWA has no such provision. The 1982 extension made all descendants eligible regardless of whether they had been granted citizenship elsewhere.

Greece and Turkey exchanged 1.6 million people in 1923 and resolved the question within a decade. India and Pakistan displaced 14 million in 1947 and granted constitutional citizenship within three years. The same Arab states that maintained Palestinian refugees in stateless camps simultaneously expelled between 850,000 and 900,000 Jews from their own countries; Israel absorbed most of them under the Law of Return, and their descendants are full citizens today. The original Palestinian displaced population, at approximately 700,000, was smaller than any of these cases. What is without parallel is the institutional response: an apparatus designed to prevent the resolution that every comparable displacement achieved, transforming 700,000 into 5.6 million registered refugees across five generations.

These consequences were structural and predictable. An identity organized around what it opposes rather than what it builds cannot generate the foundations statehood requires, and a political project premised on a return that recedes with each generation cannot deliver the future it promises. Three generations of Palestinians were educated primarily in resistance, with no corresponding preparation for what follows resistance. Political movements that eliminated their own moderates in the 1930s produce political cultures in which moderation remains dangerous. The catastrophe in Gaza is not the inevitable expression of who these people are. It is the predictable result of what was built around them.

What the international community calls “resistance” has a specific form. It produced a culture in which the murder of children was met with street celebrations, classrooms where seven-year-olds learned martyrs’ names alongside arithmetic, and a political culture so organized around death that the prayer for the annihilation of a neighboring people became an expression of identity rather than a departure from it. Five decades of education in martyrdom, resistance, and collective grievance produces what education always produces: exactly what it was designed to teach. The movement needed a people who saw dying as victory and living as insufficient. That is the people it made.

The Arabs of the Mandate and their descendants are real people. They have real culture, real attachment to land, and real suffering. Mahmoud Darwish, who turned the experience of displacement into some of the greatest Arabic-language verse of the twentieth century, was writing about actual loss. The families who left or were expelled in 1948 were real people with real homes. None of that is in dispute.

What is in dispute is whether the political project constructed in their name has ever served their interests. Arab states kept Palestinian refugees stateless because stateless Palestinians remained politically useful. The Arab League created the PLO because a controlled Palestinian movement served regional power dynamics. International donors funded UNRWA for seven decades because the Palestinian refugee crisis provided a language of grievance that satisfied requirements on multiple continents. On the question of what the people themselves actually wanted, the historical record is clear.

They wanted to be Syrian. They wanted Jordanian citizenship. The moderates among them wanted accommodation. Every choice was taken from them. What remained was the identity they were never given the chance to refuse: children taught that martyrdom is the highest aspiration, crowds that celebrate massacre as victory, a prayer for the annihilation of a people offered as resistance in classrooms funded by international donors. That is what was engineered for them, handed to them as liberation, and described by everyone who built it and everyone who funded it as “self-determination”.


Writing this has not been a simple task, and has required my stepping outside of my usual analytical frames. I invite you to explore these ideas in a greater depth, not to change your position on the current politics of the region, but to understand that the current range of possible solutions is shaped by our ability to understand both what was, and what is.

As such, I am publishing my work on this for a short time here for anyone to download.

  

 The UN is What Happens When Bureaucracy Acquires Diplomatic Immunity From Reality

The UN does not arbitrate peace in the Middle East; it launderizes aggression against Israel into legitimacy and recasts Israeli survival as the central problem 


Institutional decay carries a particular smell. It is the smell of stale carpets in government buildings, of committees discussing committees and the unmistakable stench of moral cowardice masked as diplomatic sophistication. The smell of people who have not solved a single major problem in decades but insist on lecturing those who actually do.

The United Nations (UN) reeks of it.

This week provided yet another example. As Hezbollah continues to fire rockets, drones, and missiles at Israeli civilians from Lebanon, and after years of building a large terrorist army directly under UN peacekeepers’ noses, the UN found time to condemn Israel for operating inside Lebanon while once again speaking of “both sides” and “de-escalation.”

One could almost admire the consistency if the UN were not so repugnant.

The Iran-backed Hezbollah violates every major commitment it ever made. It has turned Lebanon into a failed state, transformed southern Lebanon into an Iranian missile colony, and built military infrastructure across an entire region that tens of thousands of UN personnel were supposed to monitor. It has launched thousands of rockets and openly declares its intention to destroy Israel.

And the UN responds as it always does.

With concern. Concern is its primary export. Concern is what it manufactures when evil comes knocking.

The UN is concerned about Hezbollah. And Hamas. And their patron Iran. And genocide. And terrorism. And war. And, somehow, even peace.

It is concerned about everything except its own spectacular uselessness.

The most revealing passage in the latest Lebanon crisis was not the criticism of Israel. That is routine. It was UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres insisting that UN peacekeepers must remain in Lebanon after the current mission expires.

Remain to do what, exactly?

They have already spent decades there and achieved as much as the average French civil servant.

Hezbollah’s military buildup, which was as large as 150,000 missiles before Israel began dismantling it, occurred while they were there. Its terror tunnels and rocket launch sites appeared while they were there, too.

The greatest military threat on Israel’s northern border emerged directly inside the area that UNIFIL, the UN’s troops, was supposedly monitoring.

If a security guard spends 20 years watching a bank and the bank is robbed every single day, most people would fire him.

The UN wants a promotion.

That is the genius of the UN system. Failure is never evidence that a program should end. Failure is evidence that the program requires more money, more staff, more meetings, and more speeches.

No private organization could survive under such conditions. Only a taxpayer-funded international bureaucracy can fail upward indefinitely. UNIFIL is a monument to institutional incompetence.

A scarecrow has a presence; the UN does not.

Israel has complained for decades that the mission failed to prevent Hezbollah from establishing itself throughout southern Lebanon and the UN ignored those complaints because acknowledging reality would require admitting failure.

Even now, after all that has happened, there are voices inside the UN arguing for thousands of peacekeepers to remain because otherwise there might be a security vacuum.

A security vacuum? There was a security vacuum while the peacekeepers were already there.

The larger problem, however, goes far beyond Lebanon.

The UN’s hostility toward Israel is not a bug. It is not an unfortunate byproduct of a few biased officials. It is not the result of misunderstanding.

It is the system functioning exactly as designed.

The organization has spent decades constructing an alternate reality in which the world’s only Jewish state occupies a unique position as humanity’s primary villain. Not China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Syria, or the Taliban.

Israel.

The country whose population would fit comfortably inside many global cities, which has spent most of its existence surrounded by enemies, and which absorbed the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust on October 7.

That country.

The UN Human Rights Council condemns Israel with the obsessive energy of a stalker. Israel is the only nation with its own permanent agenda item. Every session guarantees another round of ritual denunciations.

If a Martian landed at UN headquarters and examined the voting records, it would conclude that Israel is responsible for every evil on Earth and is an enormous country of singular importance.

Climate change. War. Famine. Economic stagnation. Diplomatic paralysis. Everything eventually leads back to the Jews. The old antisemitism accused Jews of poisoning wells. The modern version accuses Israel of poisoning international morality.

The language has changed; the obsession has not.

This helps explain why UN agencies repeatedly find themselves entangled with the very terrorist groups they claim to oppose.

UNRWA employees participated in the October 7 atrocities. UNRWA facilities repeatedly intersected with Hamas infrastructure. UN officials routinely discover astonishing blind spots whenever Islamist terrorists are involved.

The pattern is impossible to ignore. The organization that cannot find Hezbollah missiles hidden throughout southern Lebanon somehow always manages to find Israeli wrongdoing. The organization that missed Hamas’s preparations for October 7 somehow never misses an opportunity to condemn Israeli self-defense. The organization that struggles to identify terrorists can identify Israeli faults with preternatural precision.

What a remarkable coincidence.

Then there is UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, the least impressive diplomat of his generation. History may yet remember him, though not in the manner he would prefer.

His infamous observation that Hamas’s atrocities “did not happen in a vacuum” revealed everything one needs to know.

Imagine applying that logic elsewhere.

The attacks of September 11 did not happen in a vacuum.

The Bataclan massacre did not happen in a vacuum.

ISIS murders did not happen in a vacuum.

Technically true. Morally grotesque.

When terrorists butcher civilians, the first responsibility of decent people is to condemn the terrorists. The UN, not being especially decent, feels compelled to explain them.

That distinction matters. One is morality. The other is rationalization, which has become the UN’s preferred dialect.

The organization’s defenders argue that despite its flaws, the UN remains essential.

Essential for what?

Preventing wars? The world is experiencing one of the highest numbers of conflicts in generations.

Preventing aggression? Russia sits on the Security Council.

Protecting human rights? Some of the world’s worst human rights abusers help shape UN human rights policy.

Fighting terrorism? The organization’s record speaks for itself.

The UN survives largely because it benefits from an outdated reputation inherited from a different era.

It still draws legitimacy from the memory of the postwar order that created it.

Yet institutions cannot live forever on nostalgia. Eventually they must justify their existence.

The UN cannot.

Instead, it functions as a global theatre company performing a never-ending morality play. Delegates arrive. Speeches are delivered. Resolutions are passed. Israel is condemned. Nothing improves. The actors take their bows and return next year for another performance.

Meanwhile, actual countries solve actual problems using actual power. The most important lesson Israel should draw from the UN is that it cannot guarantee Israeli security, defeat Hezbollah, stop Hamas, restrain Iran, or even describe reality.

Israel was not created to win popularity contests at Turtle Bay. It was created because Jews learned that institutions promising protection fail Jews with uncanny efficiency.

The UN embodies that lesson perfectly. For decades it has demanded Israeli restraint while showing inexhaustible patience for those seeking Israel’s destruction. It has mistaken moral equivalence for moral seriousness. It has confused diplomacy with virtue. It has elevated process above truth.

Most of all, it has convinced itself that the Jewish state exists to be managed, corrected, and disciplined by an international elite that cannot even secure the territory directly outside its own peacekeeping compounds.

The result is an institution increasingly divorced from reality and increasingly hostile to the one Middle Eastern democracy that refuses to die on command.

The UN still imagines it sits in judgment over Israel.

The truth is the opposite.

The UN is being judged.

And the verdict is institutional bankruptcy.

 

 

 

Thursday, June 4, 2026

 The Racket We Didn't Vote For

 How Western governments traded your safety for quiet oil deals and the modern form of vassalage we are living through


Western governments didn’t just bend the knee to oil-producing states. They built a luxury VIP lounge for the people holding the leash, handed the taxpayers the bill, and called it “diplomacy.”

It’s a safe bet absolutely nobody voted for this. No citizen in the UK, the US, France, Germany, Canada, or Australia woke up on Election Day and checked a box that said, “Yes, please build a culture of institutional cowardice around Islamist ideology.” Nobody signed off on a geopolitical subscription model where Gulf state relationships get ironclad protection while domestic safety gets outsourced. It happened anyway. It happened decision by decision, over decades, by politicians who understood exactly what they were trading. They decided the public was an acceptable price to pay.

The public wasn’t consulted. They were managed.

That’s what it actually means for a population to be held hostage to its government’s foreign policy. The process lacks the drama of a bank heist. It happens in the grinding, banal reality of watching institutions learn that one specific threat is entirely untouchable, and then watching what happens to the people those institutions were supposed to protect.

The Bipartisan Fist-Bump

Here’s the grift. Western economies run on oil. A massive chunk of that oil flows from Gulf states whose governments have spent decades simultaneously selling the West crude and funding mosques, imams, and ideological networks across domestic backyards.

 

 

 The Last See in The East


On the morning of May 29, 1453, the Emperor Constantine XI took off his imperial regalia, so that he might die as a soldier rather than be recognized as a prince and went down into the fighting near the Blachernae wall. From that moment he disappeared from the record. By nightfall Constantinople had fallen. Mehmed II rode to Hagia Sophia and ordered the call to prayer raised inside the greatest church in Christendom. The last emperor of the East lay dead somewhere in the ruins, and no one has ever found the body.

For eleven centuries Constantinople had been the capital of Eastern Christianity. Its fall closed a chapter that had been written across the five great cities of the early Church, and it left a small mountain people in the Levant carrying a weight far heavier than their numbers should have had to bear. The Maronites.

The ancient Church was governed by five patriarchates: Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. The Council of Chalcedon in 451 ratified this arrangement, the pentarchy, as the constitutional order of Christendom. The five sees were the load-bearing pillars of the Christian world.

They fell one by one.

Antioch fell in 636, after the Byzantine army broke at the Yarmouk. Jerusalem was surrendered to the Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab in 637, barely five years after the death of Muhammad. Alexandria was taken in the same decade. Three of the five sees were under Muslim rule within a single generation of Islam’s birth.

In the Antiochian lands, what survived of the faithful was driven up into the heights the Arabs called Jabal Lubnan, the mountain of Lebanon. They gathered around the memory of Maron, the fifth-century hermit of the Orontes valley, and they held there with no empire left to protect them.

When the Maronite Church formally renewed its union with Rome at the Council of Florence in 1439, fourteen years before Constantinople fell, it brought with it the apostolic succession of Antioch, one of the original sees founded in the first generation of the Church. The Maronite Patriarch has borne the title Patriarch of Antioch and All the East without a single break ever since: through the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, through the Crusader kingdoms, through the Mamluk sultans and four centuries of Ottoman rule, through the massacres of 1860, when more than ten thousand Maronites were killed in one summer, and through the Great Famine of 1915 to 1918, when something close to a third of Mount Lebanon starved to death under Ottoman blockade.

Constantinople was the last pillar. When it fell in 1453, four of the five ancient sees lay under Islam. Only Rome remained free, and Rome was in the West. In the East, one mountain church still held what the others had lost: a patriarchate, a homeland, and a line unbroken since the apostles.

The Maronites, and the other Eastern Christians the mountain took in, the Greek Orthodox of Koura and Batroun, the Greek Catholics of the Beqaa, the Armenians who came to Beirut with nothing after the genocide, did more than survive. They built.

Universities, hospitals, schools, newspapers, monasteries, political parties, towns that governed themselves. And a way of living together in which the largest sect did not simply rule the rest. Almost nowhere else in the Middle East was that ever built at all.

Lebanon itself came from this. In 1920, the Maronite Patriarch Elias Howayek went to Paris and stood before Clemenceau and Wilson and asked for a country, not a refuge, a Lebanon big enough to live. What he wanted was a place where the old law of the region did not apply, where a faith did not have to be the majority to be safe.

That country is broken now. Corruption ate it, weak men sold it, and Iran’s proxy took what was left. But it was real, and that it was real is the whole point, because the other paths were taken too, and you can see where they led.

The Copts of Egypt are ancient and they endure, but they live by the state’s permission. The Assyrians of Iraq were about 1.4 million in 2003. Now they are counted somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000, most of a people gone in twenty years, and the world hardly turned its head. Syria’s Christians were once a tenth of the country and have lost more than half their number since 2011.

There is a concept in Roman law, and Antioch was a Roman city, called nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet. No one can transfer more rights than he himself possesses.

What passed to the Maronite Church, and by extension to Lebanese Christians more broadly, was not only a liturgical tradition and a set of beautiful vestments. It was the guardianship of the Levant, the land where the faith of Israel and then the Church were born, the ground of Abraham and Moses and the Incarnation itself.

An estimated fourteen million people of Lebanese Christian origin live outside Lebanon today, in São Paulo, Abidjan, Detroit, Sydney, Paris, Caracas, and dozens of other cities. Many families left after 1975. Many more are leaving now. But a Christianity kept only in the diaspora, in festivals and folk dances and parishes far from the mountain, is not the Church of Antioch and Chalcedon. It is the museum of it.

Since Jerusalem fell to the Caliph Umar in 637, the Eastern Church has lived under Islam, day after day, century after century, in violence, in fragile truce, in ordinary neighborliness, and always under pressure. That witness cannot be reproduced from the outside. It is what John Paul II meant when he said Lebanon is more than a country, it is a message, proof that in the East another arrangement is still possible, that the Christian need not choose only between exile and submission.

Lebanon’s Christians are still a third of the country. They still hold land, schools, churches, votes, and the memory of who they are. By every rule the region runs on, they should be a handful of old families by now, their churches kept as museums. They are not. That did not happen by luck. It happened because people decided, again and again, not to vanish.

The task of Lebanon’s Christians now is to keep that message in the present tense. Not to perform it for Western audiences. Not to sell it to diplomats while the pews empty out behind them. To live it, with enough numbers, enough institutions, and enough nerve that it does not slip into the past tense.


Mario Dayba is a contributor to the Ideological Defense Institute.


 

 

 The EU Discovers Trump Was Right on China

Europe’s industrial base could be obliterated in less than a decade. They have only themselves to blame


NOTE: Europe chose to get in bed with its enemies. It filled its cities with military-aged male Muslims who hate it. It made itself dependent on Russian energy while shutting down countless power plants and oil fields. Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, during which it has ceaselessly saber-rattled and hectored the U.S. to “do more”, it has literally sent twice as much money to Moscow for energy as to Kiev in aid.

And then there’s China.

Donald Trump warned the world that China was a predator, exporting its deflation and overbuilding its industrial plant to drive all legitimate competitors under and thereby dominate the consumer markets it lacks at home. The Beltway refused to hear that message, but the American people heard it loud and clear. Brussels was more obstinate than either.

Now, the awakening. It’s not too late. But it’s awfully late. 

Europe’s leaders are waking up to the terrifying danger that China could obliterate much of their industrial base within less than a decade, shattering the old political order and the EU project itself.

The Rhodium Group says the Chinese Communist Party is digging in its heels, doubling down on a strategy of systemic over-investment and over-reliance on exports that cannot be absorbed by the rest of the world, and certainly not a Europe already in semi-slump.

The original “Made in China 2025” plan a decade ago targeted a clutch of specific technologies. Beijing is now expanding this into an “industrial policy of everything”: cars, machinery, chemicals, pharma, software, AI, you name it.

China is pursuing this ruthlessly, aiming to capture a larger share of global value added with vertical control of the entire lifecycle.

It is moving towards autarky in its home market while undercutting the West in its own market and in third countries — everywhere and in every product. It devours foreign technology without releasing its own. The Rhodium Group said the foundations of G7 manufacturing are under comprehensive threat.

The “China Shock 2.0” is bigger and more sophisticated than the original China Shock in the 1990s and early 2000s, which flooded the world with cheap goods and wiped out swathes of blue-collar manufacturing in the West.

America bore the brunt of the first shock. The pauperization of the Midwest Rust Belt set the stage for Donald Trump.

As much as China must have access to the giant U.S. consumer market, this time China can’t easily dump its excess capacity on the U.S. because of Trump’s trade barriers. The tsunami is instead being displaced into the softer target of Europe. It is hitting with even greater intensity. China’s trade surplus hit a record 1 percent of global GDP last year. No country has ever reached such an imbalanced position in modern economic history.

“Every day, China posts a €1bn trade surplus with the EU. If we do nothing, by 2027, our trade deficit will reach €500bn. That is not economically sustainable,” said Stéphane Séjourné, vice-president of the European Commission.

“We can’t let Europe be the victim of a predatory strategy that is destroying our industry,” he told Le Monde.

Communist China is pursuing more or less the same policy of autarky and one-way trade as the Qing Dynasty in the 19th century. In that era it sucked up the world’s silver. Today is sucking up the world’s aggregate demand. China seems culturally unable to trade on normal footing of balance and reciprocity.

Note well: the 19th century did not end well for China. But it did a lot of damage first.


 

China is a contradiction, wrapped in a paradox, to borrow a Churchillian turn of phrase. The hyper-growth miracle of the past 40 years has hit a dead end, undermined by debt saturation, a burst property bubble, fiscal limits, and the vast wastage of malinvestments.

China’s share of world GDP has fallen for the past four years at market exchange rates and is near lows seen a decade ago. The economy is in structural decline. It has dropped to two-thirds of US levels despite electrotech supremacy.

Semi-bankrupt Chinese companies are trying to export their way out of the internal deflation. The Communist Party is abetting this as a survival strategy for itself, deploying an arsenal of opaque subsidies — 4.4 percent of GDP by the IMF’s estimates — to keep firms afloat and to divert its latent unemployment onto the rest of the world. The export surge is a function of the deep fundamental crisis at home.

But the consequences for Europe could be catastrophic. Here’s why...